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Abstract: 
The summer of 2014 saw several campaigns to name the dead of Gaza. This paper aims to 
explore these initiatives through the idea of the ‘human’; understood both in terms of 
grievability, as a life that matters, and as a ‘litigious name’ employed by subaltern groups to 
make political demands. My argument in this paper is that politically not all attempts at 
nomination are equivalent and that a distinction needs to be drawn between those carried out 
on behalf of the ‘ungrievable’ and those engaged in by them. Only the latter enables a critical 
politics of the human potentially capable of transforming the prevailing order of grievability 
in order to make their lives count. After exploring the interventions that occurred in Gaza in 
2014, I turn to how the Western (and Israeli) media represent international deaths to consider 
what that reveals about the differential valuation of human life. To help make my case I 
elaborate the idea of an order of grievability. I then explore various attempts by others to 
name Gaza's dead, and the limitations of their ensuing politics, before finally examining the 
activities of Humanize Palestine as an example of a more radical, critical politics of the 
human.  
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Introduction 
Throughout July and August of 2014, as numerous media outlets in the UK, US, and 
elsewhere publicized mortality statistics on a daily basis, it was difficult not to be bombarded 
with the numbers of those killed and injured in the conflict in Gaza. In conjunction with its 
televised reports, the BBC ran online features exploring the ‘toll of operations in Gaza’.1 
Israel’s oldest daily newspaper, Haaretz, released ‘live updates’ of fatalities for each 
numbered day of the crisis,2 while the New York Times published both ‘The Toll in Gaza and 
Israel Day by Day’ and a daily running total of the dead (both Israeli and Gazan).3 Alongside 
the body counts, however, something else was happening. Sometimes clandestinely, 
sometimes openly, scribbled on walls or listed in advertisements, occasionally the source of 
legal wrangling, or the prompt for charitable fund-raising, concerted efforts were under way, 
particularly on social media, to name the dead of Gaza publically.  
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 It is this contestation over the representation of Gaza’s dead that I investigate in this 
paper.4 I am interested, in particular, in why naming is regarded as preferable to statistical 
accounting as a way to record death. I take as my focal point the idea of the ‘human’. I have 
two reasons for this. First, ways of representing the dead (as named individuals or as 
statistical abstractions) are symptomatic of the workings of what Judith Butler has called 
grievability, described, by her, as ‘a condition of life’s emergence and sustenance’.5 
Grievability links etymologically with grief and, by inference, with death; thus what is often 
stressed in research on grievability is how the dead are represented, for example, in 
obituaries, newspaper reports and the like. But grievability is not a synonym for grief or for 
death; it is a way to think about liveability. An order of grievability, I argue (and I explicate 
this concept more fully below) certainly determines how different deaths are hierarchically 
ranked and how those deaths figure, if at all, in public discourse. But crucially it also governs 
which lives matter, thus regulating who is deemed fully – that is meaningfully – human, in 
the specific sense of having a life judged worthy of value, support and protection. It is this 
sense of the human, where being human signifies being grievable qua having a life that 
counts, that I deploy in this paper.6  
 Second, the human, I argue, is also a category openly invoked by subaltern groups to 
make political claims. The term functions as a means to stage a political dispute: to contest 
specific modalities of exclusion, subordination, or dehumanization and thereby to enact 
equality. And Gaza was no exception. One of the initiatives examined in this paper, 
Humanize Palestine, articulates its efforts to name the dead explicitly by way of the human, 
an idea it summons (invoking the first sense of the human noted above) when it asserts ‘that a 
Palestinian life is no less valuable than the life of another’.7 What interests me here is the 
politics of the human entailed when, in order to make the lives of particular peoples matter, 
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the category of the human is appropriated as, what Jacques Rancière calls, a ‘litigious’ 
name.8  
 To do so, I focus on a series of efforts to name the dead of Gaza. My position is that, 
politically, not all efforts at nomination are equivalent. A distinction needs to be drawn 
between nominalizing actions undertaken by privileged or protected others and those 
undertaken by subaltern populations. For all the laudable aspirations that might drive the 
former, such initiatives, I submit, treat humanity as a status conferred on one party by 
another; leave unexamined the questions of power and authority at work here; assume a logic 
of assimilation; and fail to problematize the norm of humanization in play. In contrast, those 
activities engaged in by the ‘ungrievable’ (to borrow Butler’s expression) entail a 
performative politics, in which the ungrievable themselves enact their humanity and 
grievability by appropriating the very category, the human, from which they are excluded. 
They do so not in order to demonstrate that they fit an existing (normative) category of the 
human nor to seek inclusion within an existing order of grievability. Politically, they strive to 
make themselves count, rather, by disrupting and reconfiguring the prevailing order of 
grievability, thereby subverting and resignifying what it means to be human.  
 The paper is structured in four parts. In the first part, I return to my opening examples 
of the conflict in Gaza to consider the nature of these interventions and the purposes they 
ostensibly serve in naming the dead, drawing attention in particular to the charge that treating 
Palestinian deaths in statistical terms is dehumanizing. Since the ‘Western’ media, usually 
referred to generically rather than being specified, sometimes including and sometimes 
excluding the Israeli press,9 was identified by some campaigns as responsible for perpetrating 
this dehumanization, in the second part I explore briefly the role of the media in propagating 
a ‘hierarchy of death’.10 Useful as this concept is in illuminating the ranking of deaths of 
different populations, it is not sufficient to capture all that the idea of grievability entails. So 
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here I elaborate the concept of an order of grievability employed in this paper, suggesting 
how it conditions the representation of Gazan deaths as nameless statistics.  
 The third and fourth parts of the essay return to the efforts to name the dead discussed 
in part one in order to explore the politics they entail. Part three focuses on the acts of 
nominalization carried out on behalf of the people of Gaza, considering both their purpose 
and their primary audience. I argue that although they attempt to demonstrate that Gazan 
lives matter and, as such, should not be discounted out of hand, they are nevertheless limited 
politically in three ways; first, in their focus, which is to alter the perceptions of a specific 
audience towards the people of Gaza rather than engaging directly with them. Second, they 
entail a politics that rests on inequality; one conducted by the relatively secure and privileged 
towards the vulnerable. Thirdly, that their logic treats humanity as a status granted by one 
party to another. Not only does this appear to suggest that a life is meaningful only when and 
if the powerful acknowledge it as such; intentionally or otherwise, it positions subaltern 
populations as passive victims awaiting the intervention of others.  
 Part four explores what I am calling a critical politics of the human. This is a 
performative politics centred on the actions of the ungrievable as they claim grievability, and 
thus humanity, for themselves. To illustrate what such a politics looks like I explore the 
activities of Humanize Palestine in both naming the dead of Gaza and in asserting that their 
lives matter. I am interested in the ways that performatively invoking the name of the human, 
in such a setting, enables the ungrievable, firstly, to counter their designation as ungrievable 
as defined within a particular order of grievability and, secondly, to constitute themselves as 
resistant political subjects.  
  
Once upon a time, they used to have names, and faces’ 11  
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Over a three day period during July, the Tumblr blog ‘names on walls’ posted photographs of 
graffiti scrawled by an unnamed Israeli or Israelis on walls in Be’er Shiva, Israel, naming 
some of the Palestinians killed in the first five days of the Gaza conflict.12 That same month, 
reacting to what it considered to be, ‘contrary to the IBA’s [Israeli Broadcast Authority] own 
rules’,13 the failure of domestic news programmes in Israel to broadcast the names of 
Palestinian fatalities, Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem produced its own 90-second 
radio advertisement called ‘The children of Gaza have a name’ offering a ‘partial list’ of the 
children killed in the first weeks of the conflict.14 B’Tselem’s attempts to buy a spot on IBA 
Radio to air the advertisement were refused on the basis that it was ‘politically 
controversial’.15 In response, B’Tselem uploaded the advertisement to Facebook where 
‘within hours’, it claims, it was listened to by ‘almost 300,000 people’ and ‘shared more than 
900 times’.16 
 On July 28, the US-based Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP) and the Institute for Middle 
East Understanding (IMEU) released a video on YouTube, as part of its Freedom for 
Palestine: #GazaNames Project, in which various ‘celebrities, artists, and activists’ (including 
American Jews and Palestinians) hold up signs with the names and ages of Palestinian 
dead.17 The video and accompanying website encouraged others to ‘take action’ by 
submitting ‘a photo of how you choose to resist, or the name of the person you want to 
memorialize’.18 In early August, the charity Save the Children placed a full page 
advertisement in several UK national newspapers entitled ‘In Memory of the 373 Children 
Killed in Gaza 8 July – 3 August 2014’ that listed their names.19 
 The summer also saw the launch of two crowdsourcing ventures: the first, Beyond 
Numbers, describes itself as a ‘global initiative powered by a group of youth from around the 
world, based across five continents [sic] (Africa, Asia, Europe, South America, North 
America)’ with a platform ‘regularly updated by Palestinians living in the conflict zone’. 
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Sub-titled ‘People Beyond Numbers’, it aims to remember ‘the Victims of Israeli Operation 
“Protective Edge” on Gaza’20 by collecting and posting ‘the names, images and stories of 
those [Palestinians] that have lost their lives’.21 The second, Humanize Palestine, was a 
‘community effort’ set up in response to the killing, by three Israelis, of Palestinian teenager 
Mohammad Abu Khedir. 22 Its online memorials attempt ‘to honor the deceased as martyrs by 
bringing them back to life through their pictures, stories, art, and poetry’.23  
 Although all of these interventions were united by their efforts to name the dead, their 
reasons for doing so differed. The graffiti artist(s) whose activism is documented by ‘names 
on walls’ is reported as daubing ‘the names in an effort to change the anonymous nature of 
those killed’.24 The rationale behind Save the Children’s poster is made clear in the statement 
from its Chief Executive, Justin Forsyth, which accompanied its launch: 
 To see the names of the children, some as young as a few months, written in stark 
black and white brings home the tragedy that has befallen Gaza’s children. One 
child’s death is too many; 373 is an outrage that is a stain on the world’s conscience. 
We condemn all indiscriminate attacks on civilians in Gaza and Israel and by 
publishing these names we are reminding the world of the urgent need to push for a 
permanent ceasefire. We must ensure that no more young lives are needlessly 
sacrificed. 25 
The poster was part of the charity’s campaign, ‘Gaza and Israel Conflict: Stop Killing 
Children’,26 calling on the international community to help resolve the conflict in the region 
on behalf of all its children, Palestinian and Israeli alike.27  
 The press release accompanying the launch of the #GazaNames video described it as 
part of a political initiative ‘speaking out for Palestinian human rights’ and expressing 
‘support for Palestinian freedom, equality and justice’ in the face of ‘Israel’s disproportionate 
attack on the Palestinian people’ in Gaza.28 In the words of Rebecca Vilkomerson, executive 
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director of Jewish Voice for Peace, the video offered a ‘platform for the growing list of 
prominent individuals who are outraged by Israel’s brutal violence against Gaza’s civilian 
population’.29 Similar sentiments lie behind Beyond Numbers. Its efforts to remember ‘all 
innocent victims of the Israeli Operation “Protective Edge” on Gaza’ were driven by a desire 
to ‘inspire the world to take action and call for the end of the violence’ and by its 
commitment to ‘a free and unoccupied Palestine’.30   
For all their diversity, one concern was shared by several campaigns. It relates to the 
‘Western’ and Israeli news media’s ‘routinized reporting’ of Gaza’s dead as abstractions – ‘as 
x numbers killed and y numbers wounded’.31 ‘The mothers, fathers, sons and daughters 
who’ve been killed are not numbers…Each one has a name, an age, a story’ announces the 
voice-over in the #GazaNames video. Beyond Numbers writes of the need to portray ‘a 
victim and his/her story, rather than a number to add to the death count’. Explaining why this 
is necessary, the website authors contend that ‘Due to the absence of transparent reporting in 
the region, news about the fallen is narrowly focused on numbers and often fails to include 
personal details about those who have lost their lives’.32 B’Tselem Executive Director, Hagai 
El-Ad, reflects similarly on the alleged reluctance of the Israeli media specifically to report 
‘on the persons killed in Gaza, other than noting the general number of casualties’.33 
B’Tselem is not alone, though, in expressing disquiet about its alleged reluctance of the 
Israeli media to name names. In an article in Haaretz, journalist Asher Schechter discussing 
B’Tselem’s advertisement, notes that ‘Every person has a name, yes, but it turns out not all 
names are worthy of being read on [Israeli] TV’.34 ‘[A]s the list of dead children grew’, he 
notes, in the news ‘most remained nameless casualties. Mere statistics, disputed statistics.’35  
The founders of Humanize Palestine, Dana Saifan and Bayan Abusneineh, make 
parallel claims about the Western media, lamenting its continued reduction of ‘Palestinians to 
numbers’.36 Writing about the initiative, Abusneineh expresses concerns that ‘Palestinians are 
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portrayed through the media as nothing more than a death toll’,37 continuing ‘We don’t know 
anything about them’. As such the media constructs Palestinians as persons with ‘forgettable 
names’;38 aligns ‘Palestinian bodies with death and disposability’;39 and engages in the 
‘dehumanization and “othering” of Palestinians’,40 a judgement shared by Beyond Numbers 
whose website similarly describes Western reporting as ‘dehumanizing the Palestinians and 
their cause’.41  
In the next section, therefore, I consider briefly what is at stake in Western news 
coverage of the struggle in Gaza, before setting out what I mean by an order of grievability. 
My aim here is not to present an in-depth analysis of how the conflict was handled; this paper 
is not primarily an examination of reporting practices of the media (‘Western’ or Israeli) in 
relation to Gaza, specifically, or the Middle East, in general. It focuses on the politics of the 
human entailed by efforts, such as those documented here, to claim grievability for subaltern 
populations, to make their lives matter, in contexts where they appear not to. Understanding 
how the media report their deaths is fundamental to understanding how grievability operates 
in this geopolitical context. 
   
Ordering grievability 
The observation that the deaths of different populations are reported publically in diverse 
ways is not new.42 From at least the late 1990s onwards, academic commentators have 
repeatedly pointed to what Roy Greenslade labelled the media’s ‘hierarchy of death’.43 This 
is a transnational hierarchy in which (variously) ‘foreign deaths always rank below domestic 
deaths …. deaths at home provide human interest stories that people want to know about, 
while the deaths of foreigners are merely statistics’;44 women’s deaths count for more than 
men’s, particularly if they are young and white; race and class impact on the volume of 
reporting;45 and deaths in an ‘ongoing conflict always receive less coverage than unexpected 
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deaths elsewhere’.46 Or, in an alternative geographically-inflected formulation, a ‘hierarchy 
of the dead’ where: 47 ‘One dead fireman in Brooklyn is worth five English bobbies, who are 
worth 50 Arabs, who are worth 500 Africans’.48  
 The mainstream media’s tendency (in Britain, the US, and Israel) throughout the 
summer of 2014, therefore, to record Gaza’s dead primarily in numerical terms appears to be 
evidence of just such a hierarchy. Because violent death in the region, particularly amongst 
Palestinians, is regarded as unexceptional, even normal, the death of a Gazan, unless it is 
extraordinary or unexpected in some way, is treated as ‘just another statistic in an old story 
with too many tragedies’; a story in this case about non-White, non-‘Western’ foreigners. 49  
Describing a hierarchy of death, however, is not the same as explaining how it is 
produced. Hitherto media scholars have tended to point in explanation to factors such as: the 
proximity (geopolitical, cultural, economic, linguistic, and political) of the death-event in 
question; the presence or absence of a news desk in a particular location; restrictions placed 
on reporting by governments or other controlling interests; the ‘newsworthiness’ of a story; 
whether the incident is a natural disaster; whether it involves women and/or children; whether 
it results from violence; the number of tourists affected; as well as other strategic and 
historical considerations.50 I want to pursue a different line of inquiry centred on the human. 
My contention is that the rank ordering of deaths just alluded to, operationalized via the 
factors just listed, is indicative of the existence and ongoing operation of, what I am calling, 
an order of grievability and the norms that configure it.  
The notion of an ‘order’ I borrow from Rancière’s idea of the ‘police order’, which he 
describes in Disagreement as ‘an order of bodies that defines the allocation of…ways of 
doing, ways of being, and ways of saying’.51 This order of bodies is hierarchical and 
inegalitarian, determining, amongst other things, who has a part in society and who does not, 
whose speech is audible as meaningful speech and whose is not, and what kinds of activity 
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are visible and which are not. I derive the idea of grievability from Butler who develops it as 
a way to explain the variable value attaching to different lives, where only some warrant 
security, care, and support. I thus understand grievability as the ‘presupposition’ for liveable, 
that is, ‘fully human’, lives.52 Taken together, an order of grievability refers to the 
hierarchical organization of who counts as a fully human subject and thus whose lives matter. 
As Butler surmises in Frames of War, however, the ability to perceive someone as grievable 
depends on their life being recognizable as a life. Each order of grievability depends, 
therefore, on ‘the normative production of ontology’.53  
To refer to ontology as normatively produced is to construe it as historically 
contingent and social. It is to argue that ontological claims are, in fact, ‘naturalized effect[s] 
of political configurations’ rather than pre-linguistic, pre-given or natural entities independent 
of social and political organization.54 Butler demonstrates this clearly in Gender Trouble 
when she explores how, through the operations of the ‘heterosexual matrix’, gender 
naturalizes binary sex as an ontological category. As such, an ontology is not a foundation; it 
is a ‘normative injunction[…]’ that sets limits to cultural intelligibility,55 conditioning what is 
apprehensible as ‘real’ and who qualifies as fully human. It is a regulatory and ‘regulated 
domain’, operating through norms (of race, gender, corporeal morphology, ethnicity and so 
forth), 56 to produce hierarchical and exclusionary effects privileging certain persons or 
populations over others.57 Ontologies, understood thus, are historically determined and 
culturally delimited, inseparable from the social and political contexts in which they are 
embedded, temporally and spatially particular. They are, furthermore, fully imbricated in 
power relations.  
As regards grievability, the normative production of ontology is visible, for Butler, in 
the way that certain dead persons, particularly non-Western others (her listings include 
‘Palestinians’, ‘Afghan peoples’, ‘Arab peoples’, ‘practitioners of Islam’,58 and ‘Iraqis’),59 do 
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not qualify for obituaries and or other forms of public recognition by the media. This is 
because their lives are not apprehended as lives in any meaningful sense. As persons they 
have no claim on grievability, in other words, because they do not enjoy ontological status as 
fully human.60 And the reason their lives are not (re)cognizable epistemologically as lives is 
because ontology delimits what counts as ‘real’. To categorize a particular population as 
having a diminished claim to the human is thus to claim that, in terms of the specific ontology 
in operation, it fails to meet the norms that define what that involves. This means that the 
‘termination’ of lives that are constituted as unreal – are derealized – by normative ontology, 
as Maja Zehfuss observes, are ‘something less than killing’. 61 
When I talk, therefore, of an order of grievability I am not just referring to the kind of 
comparative ranking of fatalities captured in descriptors such as those noted earlier, 
hierarchies of death or the dead. I am referring, over and above this, to the particular 
normative ontology on which a specific distribution of grievability is based, which 
determines who is fully human (and thus whose lives matter), and to the epistemological 
entailments that follow on from this ontology.62  This includes not only the norms 
conditioning public discourse (normalizing, for instance, how the deaths of certain 
populations are represented and the language used to describe them) but also those moulding 
subjects’ views of the world, framing what it is possible for them to see, to hear, and to say: 
which violent deaths, for instance, are visible as violent and which are not, whose appeals for 
support are audible as appeals for support and whose are not, and whose deaths might be 
spoken about publically and whose not.  
So far, I have talked about orders of grievability largely in the singular. However, care 
needs to be taken here. In her discussion of ‘hierarchies of grief’,63 Zehfuss quite rightly 
takes issue with Butler’s overly simplistic division between ‘highly protected Western lives’ 
and ‘disposable non-Western lives’ (or rather ‘non-Western non-lives’). She demonstrates 
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that what Butler presents as a ‘general truth’ – that non-Western lives are ungrievable – is, 
actually, a ‘point about public discourse in the United States, or perhaps in the West more 
broadly’.64 Zehfuss also criticizes Butler’s failure to acknowledge that, in fact, even in the 
terms of Western public discourse, the very populations Butler alleges are ungrievable are 
sometimes grieved. Here Zehfuss draws attention to the work of organizations such as Iraq 
Body Count in publicizing the deaths of so-called ‘ungrievable’ non-Western populations.65 
Finally, she adds to Butler’s account by exploring, what she refers to as, ‘an intriguing 
omission’ from the latter’s discussions: the existence of a particular set of grievable Western 
lives whose deaths (like those of the ungrievable) are ‘accepted as a matter of course’, 
namely those of the armed forces.66 
 What criticisms such as Zehfuss’s reveal is that it does not make sense to talk of 
grievability simpliciter; a particular population is only grievable (or ungrievable) within a 
specific order of grievability. This is true of the Palestinian populations that are my concern 
in this paper. They are not ungrievable per se. In fact, many of their deaths were reported, by 
broadcasters such as Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya News, and Al-Alam, in newspapers such as Al-
Akhbar, or announced on radio by, for instance, the Ajyal Radio Network, where they were 
mourned (and I will return to this later) as singular, irreplaceable, individuals, whose lives 
counted.  Rather they are ungrievable within the particular order reflected in and perpetuated 
by the mainstream Western (including Israeli) media, where their deaths, if they figure at all, 
are chronicled en masse, anonymously and arithmetically. For this reason, it is important to 
be aware that, globally, at any one time, plural orders of grievability exist. 
  There are three final points to note about orders of grievability. First, while within 
any particular order a broad distinction will exist between those who are grievable and those 
who are not, gradations exist. There will be lives that matter more than others amongst the 
grievable, as Zehfuss has shown, and lives that matter even less amongst the ungrievable, 
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African lives compared to Arab lives to recall Moeller’s observation. Moreover, the division 
is not fixed once and for all. Depending on circumstances, a different ranking might prevail; 
for example, in some conditions a heteronormative hierarchy positioning straight lives as 
more valuable than gay, lesbian or trans lives might preponderate. In another situation, 
civilian lives might be regarded as more valuable than military lives. Or, as in the discussion 
at hand, the issue might have transnational implications, as when non-‘Western’ lives count 
for less than ‘Western’ lives.  
 Next, orders of grievability depend for their continued functioning on what Foucault 
calls diverse ‘forms for transmission and diffusion’,67 including reiteration through 
mechanisms such as public policy (foreign and domestic), the ‘social and political 
organizations that have developed historically to maximize precariousness for some and 
minimize precariousness for others’,68 and/or the kinds of media discourse relevant here. This 
latter point is important. My claim in this paper is not that the media originate or generate 
hierarchies of death ab initio; the media is simply one of the mechanisms through which 
norms of grievability circulate and are reiterated.  Lastly, while ordering grievability is 
almost certainly inevitable in any society, no order is natural or inexorable; all are historically 
and culturally contingent. Because of which, and this is important to my discussion later on, 
any determinate order has the potential to be contested; to be interrupted, disrupted, or even 
reconfigured.  
 So far in this section, I have identified the kinds of hierarchy discernible in media 
coverage of violent death pertinent to the context at hand, have argued that they are 
symptomatic of the workings of a particular order of grievability, and have defined what I 
mean by that term. I have also intimated that multiple, intersecting norms of humanization 
(including those of gender, sex, ethnicity, and race) are at play in the production of lives that 
matter – grievable lives. There is, of course, one other factor that is relevant: in the Western 
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media’s reporting of death ‘humans’ have names while, according to Beyond Numbers and 
Humanize Palestine, those who have been dehumanized do not. They are treated as brute 
statistics. What interests me is how their ‘dehumanization’ through de-nomination might be 
countered; specifically, how ‘those of no account’ (to borrow Rancière’s phrase) might come 
to count.69 At this juncture, therefore, I return to the initiatives I began the paper with to 
consider the politics of the human discernible in their nominating activities. Here I will 
explore the distinction set out in my introduction between political interventions carried out 
on behalf of the ungrievable and those directly involving them.  
 
Naming the unnamed 
If failing to name the dead is dehumanizing, then it might reasonably be assumed that to 
name them is to humanize them, to make their lives matter. Reflecting on Chilean artist 
Alfredo Jaar’s The Rwanda Project, 70 for instance, Jacques Rancière pinpoints the power of 
visual art to ‘make seen what cannot be seen’,71 observing:  
What is not visible, what had to be made visible, was that the victims of this mass 
murder were all individuals. They had to be given their name, an inscription in the 
order of discourse and memorial, because indifference to those deaths in fact prolongs 
a certain invisibility, the feeling that these lives are external to the world of 
discourse.72 
What concerns Rancière (here and elsewhere) is ‘indifference’; indifference towards the fate 
of ‘those living beings who already did not affect us, individuals whose names were 
meaningless to us’. 73 It is precisely to sensitize us to their stories and to redistribute ‘the way 
we count’, as he puts it, that their ‘names have to be made visible’. 74 Likewise Butler’s 
speculation about what happens ‘when we attempt to name, and so bring under the rubric of 
the “human”’ those ‘we are asked not to mourn’, 75 would appear to suggest that publically 
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naming the dead is an appropriate political means to surmount the problem of their 
namelessness and invisibility. Indeed, she provides further support for this position when she 
observes how the ‘utterance of a name can come as the most extraordinary form of 
recognition, especially when one has become nameless’.76 As regards the politics of the 
human, however, a distinction needs to be drawn in my view between nominalizing acts 
carried out by the emplaced on behalf of a particular population, or some subset thereof, and 
those orchestrated or actively engaged in by subaltern populations themselves.77 There are 
three reasons for this.  
 First, the primary goal of many of the interventions previously detailed was to change 
the consciousness of a particular population (British, Israeli, American, or ‘Western’) towards 
the plight of the people of Gaza rather than acknowledging the humanity of the latter directly. 
The Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem, for instance, sought to challenge the failure 
– or refusal – of the IBA to broadcast the names of Palestinians killed in Gaza by producing 
its own advertisement in Hebrew; thus endeavouring to draw to the attention of the Israeli 
public what had, in its view, been ‘effectively silenced and erased from the public sphere’, a 
‘human issue of utmost, urgent political importance’.78 Similarly, the graffitiing of names of 
Palestinian dead on the walls of Be’er Shiva was directed foremost at its inhabitants, 
predominantly Jewish, in an effort, as one Israeli journalist wrote, to ‘remind[…] us of what 
we really want to forget’.79 Save the Children’s poster originally appeared in British daily 
newspapers: The Independent, the i, The Times, The Guardian and The Telegraph. It was 
devised, as a spokeswoman for the British-based charity notes ‘to keep the children who have 
suffered in this war at the forefront of everyone’s mind’,80 the ‘everyone’ in question being 
presumably members of the British public.81 
 Even so, we might still want to argue that despite their diversity, all of these efforts to 
name the dead are committed to the idea that Gazan lives matter; that they are – or ought to 
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be – grievable. The trouble however, and this is my second concern, is that when such 
humanizing efforts are practised in conditions of inequality, where inegalitarian power 
relations prevail as they do in the present context, as Didier Fassin notes, what follows is a 
‘politics of inequality’, ‘directed from above to below, from the more powerful to the weaker, 
the more fragile, the more vulnerable’.82 This is a politics that rests on the same asymmetrical 
‘relation of domination’ that  facilitates the discounting of the lives of the latter in the first 
place.83 Understood thus, humanness-qua-grievability is treated as a status, even a gift, 
bestowed by the already-human (the geopolitically privileged) on and received by the not-
yet-human (populations in positions of heightened vulnerability, insecurity, and precarity). 
This has two effects. It implies that a life is meaningful only when the already human, the 
emplaced or the privileged, declare it to be. This is particularly problematic where the West is 
involved; for as critics such as Mark Franke and Sunera Thobani and others have shown, it 
risks perpetuating a particular racial and imperialist dynamic.84 It also presents subaltern 
populations as passively awaiting admittance to the category of the human and not as 
resistive political actors asserting humanity in their own right.  
 Thirdly, although nominalizing initiatives such as those undertaken by #GazaNames, 
B’Tselem, and others, might help temporarily to reorder a specific hierarchy of death, such 
that Palestinian lives are recast as more worthy than they once were, in and of themselves, 
they do little to contest the norms by which the human (the life that matters) is defined and, 
thus, to trouble the reigning order of grievability. They do not, for example, interrogate the 
privilege attaching to the lives that matter (white Western lives, for instance), problematize 
the specific mechanisms through which naming as a norm of humanization takes place, or 
query which particular institutions or organs within that order are authorized to bestow or 
refuse grievability on others.85 In this sense, they extend, rather than subject to critique, 
existing indices of grievability and humanizing norms, with the effect that subaltern 
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populations are simply incorporated within and assimilated to the existing order of 
grievability when the powerful deign they might be.86   
 
Towards a critical politics of the human 
In the final part of this paper, therefore, I want to explore the politics of the human in what 
might be called its critical mode by focusing on what happens when the ungrievable 
themselves assert their humanity. In particular, I am interested in how such an assertion might 
potentially lead to a reconfiguration of the order of grievability. My argument in what follows 
is that, provisionally, a politics of the human is more likely to have transformative effects, 
firstly, when it involves, what Fiona Jenkins in a different context aptly calls, ‘an event of 
contestation’,87 leading to what Butler suggestively describes as ‘an insurrection at the level 
of ontology’. 88 A critical politics of the human, in other words, will be one that puts into 
question the sphere of appearance of the human; that is, our sense of ‘reality’ and the 
‘normal’. It will seek to rupture the normative ontology, in other words, that disallows the 
ungrievable ontological status as human. Next, unlike the appeals, discussed in the previous 
section, that petition another, in this case the media, to name those whom it does not routinely 
name, to humanize them that is, a critical politics will enact that humanity directly. It will 
arrogate to itself the authority to determine that subaltern lives matter. Lastly, a critical 
politics of the human, as already hinted, will involve resistive, political actions by the 
ungrievable themselves. It will rest on their performative assertion of their own humanity. 
As the earlier exploration of orders of grievability revealed, the ability to see others as 
grievable is shaped and consolidated by socially articulated and historically variable norms 
that constitute only some persons as fully human and thus visible within a given order of 
grievability. The dehumanization of those excluded ontologically from that order means they 
are neither perceptible nor apprehensible as normatively human, thus their lives are of no 
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particular account. This is what renders them ungrievable. In order to claim grievability, 
therefore, ungrievable populations or persons need somehow to make themselves visible, 
audible, and thus apprehensible as human. One way to do this, I propose, is by invoking ‘the 
human’, as what Rancière calls, a ‘litigious name’; 89 a name that serves, as I will show, to 
allow the ungrievable, in this context, to performatively enact their humanity. Before I turn to 
Humanize Palestine to illustrate my argument, I need first to explain what Rancière means by 
this locution. To do so it is necessary to turn, briefly, to his distinctive understanding of 
politics. 
Police, as noted earlier, is Rancière’s label for the distribution of roles and parts in 
society; how, in other words, it is organized. Operating through mechanisms such as policy, 
law, judicial decisions, as well as economic arrangements and cultural phenomena, the police 
order establishes particular modes of doing, being, and communicating.90 It thus structures 
reality – and it does so in hierarchical ways. Where police ranks persons, modes of 
knowledge and so on, politics for Rancière, by contrast, is inherently egalitarian and 
democratic, resting on what he refers to as the ‘equality of any speaking being with any other 
speaking being’.91 It begins with the staging of a ‘wrong’. This occurs when a part of society 
not acknowledged as being equal within the existing police order acts as if it is so; when, that 
is, the ‘uncounted’ (or the demos, for Rancière) ‘practices’, or implements, equality.92 When 
that happens bodies shift from their allocated places and the hierarchical police order is 
disrupted; it is denaturalized and so revealed as contingent. Rancière thus equates politics 
with ‘dissensus’, his concept for the ways in which subaltern groups contest and reject, as 
Todd May puts it, ‘the position or positions its members have been allotted’ within a given 
police order.93 
This is where the idea of litigious names becomes pertinent. Litigious names, and 
Rancière includes ‘human being’ amongst them,94 are ‘political names’ that ‘set out a 
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question or a dispute (litige) about who is included in their count’.95 They are names that 
politicize the distinction, therefore, between those encompassed by general appellations such 
as man, citizen, human and those who are not. As part of a process Rancière describes as 
‘subjectivization’, employing political names not only enables those acting politically to dis-
identify from, that is to reject, their policed identities, capacities and roles; it also facilitates 
the constitution of new (collective) resistive subjects, ones not formerly possible within the 
police order in contention.96 Subjects that become visible, in other words, through politics. 
Litigious names serve, then, as Joseph Tanke writes, both as ‘a means for resisting hierarchy’ 
and contesting inequality and for reordering ‘what is perceivable, thinkable, and possible’.97 
 It is my suggestion in this paper that we understand the actions of Humanize Palestine 
in these terms. That is, as utilizing the name of the ‘human’ litigiously in order to challenge 
how grievability, and thus humanness, are allocated within the prevailing (‘Western’) order 
of grievability, by politicizing the distinction between whose lives count and whose do not.  
On its website, an explanation is offered as to why the name Humanize Palestine was 
selected. The reason was not, it states, ‘to suggest that Palestinians are not human already or 
that Palestinians need to prove their humanity’ but rather ‘to challenge (sic) Western media’s 
dehumanization and “othering” of Palestinians’.98 From a (loosely) Rancièrian perspective, 
we might understand this statement as identifying a wrong. Asserting that Palestinians are 
already human yet, paradoxically, in need of humanization does two things. Firstly, it enacts 
the equality of a population not presently enjoying ontological status as human; one that is 
not (yet) apprehensible as such. Secondly, it points explicitly to the inegalitarianism at the 
heart of the prevailing order of grievability. This is the inegalitarianism reiterated by the 
Western media when it employs fatality metrics to represent Palestine’s dead. Furthermore, 
when, through its website and social media activities, Humanize Palestine honours Gaza’s 
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dead and refuses the representations of them circulating in the mainstream Western media, it 
expresses a dissensus, by defying the order that positions Palestinians as less than human.  
Recall that within the transnational order of grievability under scrutiny, it is alleged 
that the representation of Palestinians as nameless statistics dehumanizes them and validates 
their corporeal expendability. As Humanize Palestine’s founders indicate, this is in stark 
contrast to how Israeli deaths are reported. Pointing to the case of the three Israeli teenagers 
(Naftali Fraenkel, Gilad Shaer, and Eyal Yifrah), who went missing in June 2014,99 one of 
them notes, their ‘names, ages and pictures’ were all over the news.100 ‘We knew what they 
looked like, who their families were and whether they were good in school or not’. 101 
‘Images of them’, she comments, ‘smiling and posing with their families circulated’.102  
We might understand this objection thus: that the media’s classification of 
Palestinians in numerical terms produces them as an undifferentiated, anonymous mass by 
representing them as victims without personal histories or individuality. Conversely, Israelis 
are treated, to borrow from Jenny Edkins, as ‘persons-as-such’:103 that is, as unique, 
irreplaceable, individuals, subjects whose experiences of life, death, and suffering are quite 
unlike those of anyone else, whose hopes, dreams, and aspirations are particular to them, and 
who as persons exist within exclusive familial, communal and friendship relations. To 
counter this differential treatment, and to demonstrate the value, singularity, and humanity of 
Palestinian lives, therefore, the vignettes, or mini-obituaries, posted on Humanize Palestine’s 
various social media sites not only name each of Gaza’s dead; they share personalized stories 
about them, usually accompanied by either informal snapshots or formal photographs of the 
dead in life, as well as occasional videos by or about them.104  
Accordingly we learn that brothers Anas and Sa’ad Akram al-Skafi, for instance,  
scored 88 and 91 per cent respectively in the general secondary examination, the Tawjihi; that 
Yousef Jameen Sheikh al-Eid was a ‘nurse’, Hani Mohammad al-Hallaq a ‘web developer’, 
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Abdullah Nasr Fahjan a ‘sports journalist’, Atef Salih Alzamli an on-duty ‘paramedic’; that 
twelve year old ‘shy performer’ Sha’ban Jameel Ziada, ‘loved to sing’, six year old Kenan 
Hassan al-Hallaq ‘loved solving puzzles’, and his pregnant mother Samar Osama al-Hallaq, 
‘was involved with the Palestinian History Tapestry Project’; and that nine year old Ali 
Sha’baib ash-Shinbari was hoping to be a lawyer while footballer Abdelrahman Jamal al-
Zamli was intending to marry.105  
In terms of the critical politics of the human I sketched earlier, representing 
Palestinians like this allows Humanize Palestine to rupture the social ontology that initially 
disallows them human status, by making visible what the prevailing order sought to efface: 
their uniqueness and inimitability as persons. Operating through the litigious name of the 
human Palestinians are thus performatively constituted as fully human, as grievable beings 
whose lives matter. It is not that the human as a category is now identified definitively with a 
remodelled version that newly incorporates Palestinians within it. The human, on this 
interpretation, does not denote a particular subject, identity, or collective body that could be 
extended in this way in order to include those outside its remit.106 The purpose of Humanize 
Palestine’s intervention is not, then, to demand that Palestinians be treated like Israelis, or to 
claim they ought to occupy a similar position to them in the prevailing order of grievability. It 
is better understood as a rejection of, an insurrection against, the ontology that positions 
Palestinians as less-than-human. It is a repudiation of the order of grievability that classifies 
them as ungrievable; an effort to reconfigure what it means to be human, in the sense of 
having a life that counts. 
Moreover, as a critical politics, Humanize Palestine does not address itself to or 
directly call on the Western media to acknowledge Gazan grievability. It does not petition 
those already deemed human to recognize those denied that status or to acknowledge that 
their lives also count. In effect, it refuses the notion that the power to confer humanity rests 
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exclusively with the privileged and powerful.107 Instead, Humanize Palestine directly 
challenges the authority of the Western media to regulate who is grievable by appropriating 
the right to determine that Gazan lives matter. In the process, it subverts and resignifies 
public naming as a mode of humanization, opening it up to possibilities foreclosed within the 
order of grievability in contention.  
Finally, and relatedly, the assertion of humanity enacted by Humanize Palestine is 
undertaken by the ungrievable themselves, by those formerly assumed to be constitutively 
excluded from the category of the human. This is part of its radicality. As noted above, the 
litigious name of the ‘human’, provisionally and contingently appropriated in conditions of 
inequality, incites the appearance of (new) resistant political subjects.108 Organized and 
sourced by Palestinians, Humanize Palestine therefore serves as one medium through which 
Palestinians are able to ‘speak for themselves’,109 to ‘make themselves of some account’ 
politically.110 It is a means through which they performatively enact their grievability and 
demonstrate that they are persons whose lives count. Expressed differently, through these 
activities the not-yet-human propel themselves into public view as meaningfully human. 
 
Conclusion 
The emphasis in this paper has been on the events in Gaza in 2014. But, of course, the 
initiatives explored in this paper are far from the only ones currently seeking to assert 
grievability for the ungrievable. To give just a handful of examples: in the summer of 2013 
the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter began to appear on social media, marking the start of a 
campaign highlighting police violence against African Americans.111 This was followed in 
February 2015 by the campaign, #SayHerName, focusing on the plight of Black female 
victims of the same violence.112 On 30 April 2015, a list was laid down on the floor of the 
European Parliament naming all the ‘migrants’ drowned in the Mediterranean.113 And, 
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finally, launched in September 2013 by the London-based Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism, the project Naming the Dead records and publishes the names of all those killed 
in US drone strikes in Pakistan.114 Like Humanize Palestine, some of these interventions 
explicitly deploy the human as a litigious name, though not all do. Like Humanize Palestine 
some provide information about the dead as well as their names, though, again, not all do. In 
terms of the arguments made in this paper, all of them, however, evidence the politics of the 
human. 
 There are two inter-related aspects to this politics. First, the human is a category that 
disallows or forecloses the inclusion of certain embodied persons within it; one that rests on 
the normative operations of social ontology, operations that condition who is apprehensible 
as fully and meaningfully human and who is not. The ontological status of being 
(re)cognizable as human depends, in other words, on the functioning of various social and 
political forces, norms, and power. Second, the human is also, and somewhat paradoxically, a 
category amenable to litigious invocation by subaltern groups in specific contexts; a name 
that allows them to stage disputes contesting their subordination, dispossession, and de-
realization, disputes that – potentially, at least – make possible a reconfiguration of 
exclusionary definitions of ontology, grievability, and the human.115 This is why, in tracking 
the category of the politics of the human in this paper, I have offered no substantive account 
of the qualities or attributes assumed to devolve to it (classically: speech, language, or 
rationality), made no assumptions that all humans share the same properties or characteristics 
differentiating them from so-called ‘non-humans’, or used the term to refer to humanity or 
the human species per se.  
Instead, my focus has been on the ways in which naming, as a historical and cultural 
convention, has been aligned with humanization in a specific context, Gaza in 2014, and how, 
consequently, the failure to name Palestine’s dead, a failure amplified in this case by their 
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algorithmic representation, effects the latter’s dehumanization. In my analysis of this 
example, I have accepted prima facie the link posited, by those involved, between naming 
and humanization, and de-nomination and dehumanization. Whether nomination is ever 
really sufficient on its own to humanize the dead is moot. Arguably, enumerating long lists of 
names of the dead serves only to convey the sheer volume of those killed much in the way 
numbers do, while the routinization of such reporting risks normalizing the violent deaths of 
the populations involved much in the way that body counts do, such that the public come to 
expect and accept such killings as a matter of course. These are, however, issues for another 
time.  
What seems clear, as I have demonstrated in this paper, is that when a particular 
population is constituted as ungrievable, when its members are not apprehensible as 
ontologically human within a specific order of grievability, as in the case of Palestinians in 
respect of the Western media, then naming them publically is an act of political dissent. 
When the ungrievable undertake this task themselves, as in the example of Humanize 
Palestine, when they claim grievability for themselves, rather than have others do it on their 
behalf, their actions implement – performatively enact – the equality invoked by the human 
as a litigious name. Asserting their humanity thus is the way they establish that their lives do 
indeed count. 
 
                                                 
Acknowledgments: 
Earlier versions of this paper were delivered at the University of Cambridge Seminar for 
Contemporary Political Thought and as part of the University of Kent Public Lecture Series 
at the Brussels School of International Studies. I would like to thank both audiences for their 
very helpful comments and questions. I would also like to thank Andrew Thacker for reading 
this paper in its various iterations, as well as the anonymous reviewers for Review of 
International Studies for providing such incisive, extremely thorough, and careful comments. 
A Leverhulme Trust Major Research Fellowship funded the research project from which this 
paper arises. 
 
 26 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 ‘Gaza crisis: Toll of operations in Gaza’, BBC News, available at: 
{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28439404} accessed 1 February 2015}. 
2 See, for example, ‘Live Updates: Operation Protective Edge, day 17’, Haaretz (25 July 
2014), available at: {http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.606934} accessed 
10 August 2014}.  
3 Karen Yourish and Josh Keller, ‘The Toll in Gaza and Israel Day by Day’, New York Times 
(8 August 2014).  
4 I should, however, make clear from the outset that my focus is not the specifics of the 
reporting practices of the media in either Israel or the West more generally in respect of 
Gaza. My interest, rather, is the nature of resistance in this context to particular modes of 
address (relating to Gaza’s dead) as they relate to questions of grievability. For this reason, I 
do not seek to detail the wider nature of the reporting that took place over the summer of 
2014. Nor do I detail how Israeli dead, military or civilian, were represented except to note 
here that: (a) military deaths were reported by the international media primarily in numerical 
terms, though the US-based Jewish newspaper Algemeiner named them all. One exception to 
this was the death of Max Steinberg, an American-Israeli fighting for the Israeli Defence 
Force. His death was covered by the media in the US, Britain and Israel; (b) Israeli media 
routinely named all Israel’s dead, both military and civilian; and (c) outlets in the US and UK 
reported on and named all four of Israel’s civilian dead. For more general discussions of 
Western media reporting in the region see, for instance, Greg Philo and Mike Berry, More 
Bad News From Israel (London: Pluto, 2011); and on the Arab media’s coverage see Naila 
Hamdy, ‘Arab Media Adopt Citizen Journalist to Change the Dynamics of Conflict 
Coverage’, Global Media Journal, 1:1 (2010), pp. 3-15; and Lawrence Pintak, ‘Gaza: Of 
Media Wars and Borderless Journalism’, Arab Media & Society, 7 (2009), pp. 1-6. 
5 Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (London: Verso, 2009), p. 15. 
6 I do not, in other words, offer a substantive definition of the human. 
7 Humanize Palestine, ‘About’ {http://humanizepalestine.com/about} accessed 31 July 
2014}.  
8 Jacques Rancière, ‘Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’, The South Atlantic 
Quarterly, 103: 2/3 (2004), p. 304. 
9 Although I have serious reservations about referring simply to the ‘West’ and/or ‘Western’, 
because it risks reifying these terms and occluding the foreclosures and erasures that define 
them, I have elected to do so following the practice of those engaged in the campaigns I am 
exploring. 
10 Roy Greenslade, ‘The Damien Walsh Memorial Lecture’, Belfast (4 August 1998), 
available at {http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/media/Greenslade.html} accessed 18 April 2015}; 
see also Roy Greenslade, ‘A hierarchy of death’, The Guardian (19 April 2007).  
11 Asher Schechter, ‘When Dead Children Have No names: Israel’s Terrifying Descent into 
Numbness’, Haaretz (4 August 2014).  
12 ‘names on walls’, available at {http://namesonwalls.tumblr.com/} accessed 29 October 
2014.} The blog also links to lists, in both Hebrew and English, of the names and ages of 
Palestinians killed over the summer of 2014. 
13 Gili Izikovich, ‘Israeli Agency Bans Radio Clip Naming Children Killed in Gaza’, Haaretz 
(24 July 2014), emphasis added. 
14 Schechter, ‘Dead Children’. The advert takes its title from a poem about the Holocaust, 
which declares that ‘Every person has a name given to him by God and his parents’. 
 27 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 Hagai El-Ad, ‘Newsletter: The Children in Gaza Have Names’ (August 2014), available at: 
{http://www.btselem.org/btselem-newsletter/144561} accessed 26 November 2014}. See, for 
instance, Izikovich, ‘Israeli’ and Schechter ‘Dead Children’. B’Tselem appealed the decision, 
but the High Court of Justice found in favour of the IBA stating ‘this broadcast means to 
serve a political purpose and not to simply convey information’, Yehuda Shiezinger and Edna 
Adato, ‘B’Tselem Removed from National Service Volunteer Program’, Israel Hayom 
Newsletter (14 August 2014), available at: 
{http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=19453} accessed 29 October 
2014}. B’Tselem saw this as an act of censorship; see Izikovich, ‘Israeli’. 
16 El-Ad, ‘Newsletter’. The advert is available on YouTube at: 
{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcTbMOabFhg}.  
17 Jewish Voice for Peace, ‘Freedom for Palestine: About’, 
{http://freedom4palestine.org/about} accessed 31 July 2014}. 
18 Jewish Voice for Peace, ‘Freedom for Palestine: Submit a photo’, 
{http://freedom4palestine.org/submit} accessed 31 July 2014}.  
19 The advertisement appeared on 6 August 2014, by which time a further 35 children had 
been killed, taking the total to 408.   
20 Beyond Numbers, ‘About us’ {http://www.beyondthenumber.org/about-us/} accessed 21 
October 2014}. 
21 As well as a crowd-sourcing website, Beyond Numbers runs Facebook and Twitter 
accounts. Beyond Numbers, ‘Submit victim information’, 
{http://www.beyondthenumber.org/submit-victim-information/} accessed 21 October 2014}.  
22 Ali Abunimah, ‘Not just numbers: online memorial publishes names, faces of Palestinians 
killed in Gaza’ (27 July 2014), The Electronic Intifada, available at: 
{https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/not-just-numbers-online-memorial-
publishes-names-faces-palestinians-killed-gaza} accessed 7 August 2014}. Khedir was a 16-
year-old Palestinian, kidnapped and murdered (by beating and burning) by three Israelis (one 
adult and two youths) in revenge for the murder of three Israeli youths. See fn. 99. 
23 Humanize, ‘About’. Like Beyond Numbers, Humanize Palestine, launched a crowd-
sourcing website, as well as Facebook and Twitter accounts. Two Palestinian-Americans, 
Bayan Abusneineh and Dana Saifan, established the initiative initially as a way to collect 
together the names and images of the dead of Gaza being circulated by the ‘Palestinian 
community’ during the summer of 2014, though its remit subsequently extended beyond this.  
24 Max Schindler, ‘Israelis Scrawl the Names of the Gaza Dead on their City Walls’, 
Christian Science Monitor (16 July 2014), available at: 
{http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/0716/Israelis-scrawl-the-names-of-the-
Gaza-dead-on-their-city-walls} accessed 7 August 2014}.  
25 Cited in Alice Sharman ‘Save the Children Publishes Names of 373 Children Killed in 
Israel-Gaza Conflict’ (8 August 2014), available at: 
{http://www.civilsociety.co.uk/fundraising/indepth/case_studies/content/17965/campaign_sa
ve_the_children_publishes_names_of_373_children_killed_in_israel-gaza_conflict} accessed 
20 April 2015}. See also Lizzie Dearden, ‘Israel-Gaza Conflict: Names of 373 Children 
Killed by Bombing Released in Charity Plea for Permanent Ceasefire’, The Independent (6 
August 2014).  
26 Sharman, ‘Save’.  
27 The campaign also included a petition addressed to the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon asking for his intervention. The petition garnered some 80,000 signatures from the 
public in Britain where Save the Children is based. See more at: 
 28 
                                                                                                                                                        
{http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/donate/actions/gaza-and-israel-conflict-stop-killing-
children#sthash.tKFaAS2U.dpuf} accessed 20 April 2015} and Save the Children, 
‘Protecting Children Affected by Conflict’, available at: 
{http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/get-involved/campaigns/impact/protection} accessed 5 
November 2015}. 
28 The video begins with a voice-over that asserts that ‘For decades Palestinians have endured 
statelessness, occupation, dispossession, and a lack of basic rights while Israel has steadily 
taken their land and denied their freedom’. 
29 Cited in Jewish Voice, ‘About’. 
30 Beyond, ‘About Us’. 
31 Hanan Ashwari, ‘Foreword, in Rhoda Ann Kananeh, Birthing the Nation: Strategies of 
Palestinian Women in Israel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. xi.  
32 Beyond, ‘About Us’. 
33 El-Ad, ‘Newsletter’. 
34 Schechter, ‘Dead Children’. Schechter suggests that the more children died in the conflict, 
the less outrage and unease it evoked in the Israeli population. He notes that after four young 
boys (Ahed Atef Bakr, 10, Zakariya Ahed Bakr, 10, Mohammad Ramiz Bakr, 11, and Ismail 
Mahmoud Bakr, 9) were killed on 16 July 2014 by Israeli shells when they were playing on a 
Gaza beach, an event that had something of an impact, the lives of children became 
‘cheaper’. Their deaths were either greeted, largely, with silence or ‘in the most extreme 
margins of Israeli society’ with celebration. 
35 Schechter, ‘Dead Children’. Although there is not space to develop this point, one of the 
features of this conflict was the repeated contestation, particularly though not exclusively in 
the media, of the numbers of those reportedly killed. For a brief overview of this debate see 
Peter Hart, ‘Death in Gaza: Some Counts More Controversial Than Others’, FAIR (12 August 
2014), available at: {http://fair.org/blog/2014/08/12/death-in-gaza-some-counts-more-
controversial-than-others/} accessed 19 November 2014}. 
36 Humanize, ‘About’. Humanize Palestine’s founders do not explicitly define what they 
mean by the Western media on their website. Comments made elsewhere suggest, however, 
that this includes, but is not limited to, the Israeli and US news media. 
37 Bayan Abusneineh, ‘Reviving our Heroes: Challenging Palestinian Dehumanization’, 
Mondoweiss, 8 August 2014, available at {http://mondoweiss.net/2014/08/challenging-
palestinian-dehumanization/} accessed 11 June 2015}. Abusneineh makes a very similar 
point in her interview with Omar Baddar, ‘More than a Number: Humanising Palestine’, The 
Stream (29 July 2014) available at: {https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6QpChZLpmbY#} 
accessed 25 November 2014}. Here she notes that ‘Palestinians weren’t receiving the same 
amount of coverage … We didn’t know anything about them. Besides, they’re reduced to a 
number, statistics.’ 
38 Humanize, ‘About’.  
39 Humanize, ‘About’. Of particular concern here is the circulation on social media of images 
of the corpses of Palestinians at the time of death; in particular, of their ‘burned and mutilated 
bodies’. Since my focus is the mainstream media I do not directly address this issue at this 
time. 
40 Humanize, ‘Why we Chose “Humanize” Palestine’, 
{http://humanizepalestine.com/2014/07/29/why-humanize-palestine/} accessed 31 July 
2014}. 
41 Beyond, ‘About Us’.  
 29 
                                                                                                                                                        
42 There is a growing literature on representations of death in the news media, including 
William Adams, ‘Whose Lives Count? TV Coverage of Natural Disasters’, Journal of 
Communication, 36: 2 (1986), pp. 113-22; Folker Hanusch, ‘Publishing the Perished: The 
Visibility of Foreign Death in Australian Quality Newspapers’, Media International 
Australia, 125 (2007), pp. 29-40, ‘Valuing Those Close to Us’, Journalism Studies, 9:3 
(2008), pp. 341-56, and Representing Death in the News: Journalism, Media and Mortality 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Jonathan Ilan, ‘Over a Dead body: International 
Coverage of Grief’, Semiotica, 205 (2015), pp. 229-42; Susan D. Moeller, Compassion 
Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1999); and Terence Wright, ‘Collateral Coverage: Media Images of Afghan 
Refugees 2001’, Visual Studies, 19:1 (2004), pp. 97-111.  
43 Greenslade, ‘Damien Walsh’, and ‘Hierarchy’. See also John Taylor, Body Horror: 
Photojournalism, Catastrophe and War (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1998), p. 
90; Christina Konsantinidou, ‘Death, Lamentation and the Photographic Representations of 
the Other During the Second Iraq War in Greek Newspapers’, International Journal of 
Cultural Studies, 10: 2 (2007), pp 147-66; and Angela Keys et al., ‘The Political Economy of 
a Natural Disaster: The Boxing Day Tsunami, 2004’, Antipode, 38: 2 (2006), pp. 195-204. 
44 Greenslade, ‘Hierarchy’. 
45 Greenslade, ‘Hierarchy’, and Roy Greenslade, ‘Sian Murder Says a Lot about Media 
Values’, London Evening Standard (30 March 2011). 
46 Greenslade, ‘Hierarchy’. 
47 Marita Sturken ‘Memorializing absence’, in Craig J. Calhoun, Paul Price and Ashley S. 
Timmer (eds) Understanding September 11 (New York: New Press, 2002), pp. 374-84. 
48 Cited by Adams, ‘Whose’, p. 114, and Moeller, Compassion, p. 22.  
49 Greenslade, ‘Damien Walsh’. Greenslade’s original reference was to Northern Ireland. 
Arguably there are also other strategies at work in Western media reporting, which structure 
‘our’ perceptions of the conflict in the Middle East and in Gaza specifically, including the 
discourse of ‘human shields’ and the highly disputed question of who constitutes a ‘civilian’. 
I do not have the scope in this essay to consider them, however.   
50 See, for instance, Adams, ‘Whose’; Wright, ‘Collateral’; Hanusch, Representing; as well as 
Jack Lule, ‘Myth and Terror on the Editorial Page: The New York Times Responds to 
September 11, 2001’, Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 79:2 (2002), pp. 275-
93.  
51 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement:  Politics and Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 29. 
52 Butler, Frames, p. 14. 
53 Butler, Frames, p. 3 
54 Athena Athanasiou in Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou, Dispossession: The 
Performative in the Political (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), p. 120. 
55 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London: 
Routledge, 1990), p. 148. 
56 For consideration of the roles of norms in constituting the fully human, see Judith Butler, 
Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004) and Undoing 
Gender (London: Routledge, 2004). 
57 Judith Butler in Irene Costera Meijer and Baukje Prins, ‘How Bodies Come to Matter: An 
Interview with Judith Butler’, Signs, 23: 2 (1998), p. 280. It is also worth noting that in her 
more recent writings Butler suggests that ontology also entails ‘always being given over to 
others’ [Frames, p. 2], an idea central to the account of ethics she advocates. I discuss 
 30 
                                                                                                                                                        
Butler’s ethics further in Moya Lloyd Judith Butler: from Norms to Politics (Cambridge: 
Polity 2007); and ‘Towards a Cultural Politics of Vulnerability: Precarious Lives and 
Ungrievable Deaths’, in Terrell Carver and Samuel A. Chambers (eds), Precarious Politics: 
Critical Encounters (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 92-105. See also the essays in Moya 
Lloyd (ed.), Butler and Ethics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015). 
58 Butler, Precarious, p. 32. 
59 Judith Butler in Jill Stauffer, ‘“Peace is A Resistance to the Terrible Satisfactions of War”: 
Interview with Judith Butler’, The Believer, 117:2 (May 2003), pp. 64-72. She contrasts this 
treatment with the reading out on radio of ‘the names of the American soldiers who had been 
killed’ in Iraq. Throughout her post-9/11 work Butler has offered numerous iterations of 
similar arguments about naming the dead to those mentioned here. 
60 In fact, for Butler, the constitution of the human (subject) involves the simultaneous 
constitution of what she refers to in Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” 
(London: Routledge, 1993) as a domain of the ‘more or less “human”, the inhuman, the 
humanly unthinkable’, p. 8; see also Butler, Undoing, pp. 24-25. As such, ‘dehumanization’, 
for her, is ‘the condition for the production of the human’, Butler, Precarious, p. 91. 
Understood thus dehumanization does not refer to practices directed at those already 
constituted as human, as is more conventionally assumed. It is part of the process through 
which the human is produced. In this, dehumanization parallels Butler’s earlier discussion of 
abjection; see Lloyd, Judith Butler, pp. 74-6. See also Drew Walker ‘Two Regimes of the 
Human: Butler and the Politics of Mattering’, in Lloyd ed. Butler and Ethics, pp. 141-66. 
61 Maja Zehfuss, ‘Hierarchies of Grief and the Possibility of War: Remembering UK 
Fatalities in Iraq’, Millennium, 38: 2 (2009), p. 421. The fact, as Butler puts it, that the media 
fails to name or show the dead means that normatively ‘there never was a life, and there 
never was a death’ [Butler, Precarious, p.146]; the effect of which is to annul any violence 
committed against such persons. 
62 Specifically, the latter encompasses what Butler refers to as ‘the epistemological problem 
of apprehending a life’ consequent on the normative production of ontology (Frames, p. 3). 
63 The expression ‘hierarchy of grief’ in the singular is Butler’s; see Butler Precarious, p. 32.  
64 Zehfuss, ‘Hierarchies’, p. 423 
65 See also Maja Zehfuss ‘Subjectivity and Vulnerability: On the War with Iraq’, 
International Politics, 44 (2007), pp. 58-71.  
66 Zehfuss, ‘Hierarchies’, p. 424. It might, of course, be possible to complicate further 
Zehfuss’s own analysis of military deaths by exploring the ways in which they too might be 
differentially ranked, along the lines for instance of the analysis offered by Yagil Levy in 
Israel’s Death Hierarchy: Casualty Aversion in a Militarized Democracy (New York: New 
York University Press, 2012). 
67 Michel Foucault, ‘History of Systems of Thought’, in Donald F. Bouchard (ed.), Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1980), p. 200. 
68 Butler, Frames, pp. 2-3 
69 Rancière, Disagreement, p. 36. 
70 This is a series of twenty-one pieces, produced between 1994 and 1998, representing the 
Rwandan genocide and motivated by Jaar’s outrage at the ‘international community’s 
reaction – the barbaric indifference’ to the crisis. Jaar in ‘Alfredo Jaar: “The Rwanda 
Project”, an Interview’, art21, available at: {http://www.art21.org/texts/alfredo-
jaar/interview-alfredo-jaar-the-rwanda-project}, accessed 28 May 2015}. 
 31 
                                                                                                                                                        
71 Jacques Rancière in Marie-Aude Baronian and Mireille Rosello, ‘Jacques Rancière and 
Indisciplinarity: Interview’, Art and Research, 2: 1 (2008), p. 8. 
72 Rancière in Baronian and Rosello, ‘Indiscipinarity’, p. 8, emphasis added. 
73 Jacques Rancière, ‘Theater of Images/Le Théatre des Images’, in Nicole Schweizer (ed.), 
La Politique des Image/Politics of the Image (Lausanne: JRP | Ringier, 2007), p. 75; see also 
Rancière in Baronian and Rosello ‘Indiscipinarity’. 
74 Rancière, ‘Theater’, p. 75. This includes the names of the dead, the living victims of the 
Rwandan genocide, and killing sites.   
75 Butler, Precarious, p. 46, emphasis added. She is referring here to those killed by US and 
allied forces. See also Erica Doss, Memorial Mania: Public Feeling in America (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 112.  
76 Judith Butler, ‘Can One Lead a Good Life in a Bad Life? Adorno Prize Lecture’, Radical 
Philosophy, 176 (2012), p. 12. 
77 The term ‘emplaced’ derives from Mark Franke, ‘The Unbearable Rightfulness of Being 
Human: Citizenship, Displacement, and the Right to Not Have Rights’, 15:1 (2011), pp. 39-
56. Strictly speaking, of course, the dead can never speak for themselves so all naming is, in 
some sense, done by others. However, it is not just Gaza’s dead who, in Butler’s formulation, 
are ungrievable, so too are the living Palestinians of the region, who also do not fit the 
normative conception of the human. So, when I talk of subaltern populations acting on their 
own behalf, I am including the living. 
78 B’Tselem, ‘Press Release: IBA Censors B’Tselem Radio Spot Listing Names of Gazan 
Children Killed’ available at: 
{http://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20140721_children_killed_in_gaza_have_names} 
accessed 26 November 2014}. 
79 ‘Memorial Wall’, {http://www.ha-makom.co.il/gallery/names-on-walls} accessed 5 
November 2015}. [Translated] This news site dubbed the graffiti the ‘memorial wall’. 
80 Cited in Sharman, ‘Save’. 
81 Although I do not have scope here to elaborate on this at this time, all of these initiatives 
ultimately reached a wider audience than those for whom they were initially intended, 
primarily through their dissemination via social media.  
82 Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2012), pp. 3, 4 
83 Fassin, Humanitarian, p. 3.  
84 Franke, ‘Unbearable’ and Sunera Thobani, ‘White Wars: Western Feminisms and the “War 
on Terror”’, Feminist Theory, 8:2 (2007), p.177. See also Thomas Gregory, ‘Potential Lives, 
Impossible Deaths’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 14: 3 (September 2012), p. 
335; and Walker, ‘Two Regimes’, p. 145. 
85 For instance, while some of them engaged in criticism of a specific media for failing to 
name the dead of Gaza, they did not problematize the fact that the media (amongst other 
bodies) is authorised to do so in the first place. They simply accept as given that it has this 
role. 
86 See also Butler, Precarious, p. 33; Moya Lloyd, ‘(Women’s) Human Rights: Paradoxes 
and Possibilities’, Review of International Studies, 33: 1 (2007), pp. 91-103; and Franke, 
‘Unbearable’.   
87 Fiona Jenkins, ‘Sensate Democracy and Grievable Life’, in Lloyd, Butler and Ethics, p. 
123, emphasis in original. 
88 Butler, Precarious, p. 33. 
 32 
                                                                                                                                                        
89 Rancière, ‘Who’, p. 304; see also Jacques Rancière, ‘Politics, Identification, and 
Subjectivization’, October, 61 (1992), pp. 58-64. 
90 Samuel A. Chambers, ‘Police and Oligarchy’, in Jean-Philippe Deranty (ed.), Jacques 
Rancière: Key Concepts (Durham: Acumen, 2010), p. 61. For further discussion, see, for 
example, Samuel A. Chambers, The Lessons of Rancière (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013); Deranty, Jacques Rancière; Todd May, The Political Thought of Jacques 
Rancière: Creating Equality (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008); and Joseph J. 
Tanke, Jacques Rancière: Politics, Philosophy, Aesthetics (London: Continuum, 2011).  
91 Rancière, Disagreement, p. 30. 
92 Equality as Rancière thus understands it is not something granted, distributed, or protected 
by the state via, for instance, rights or the law. It is not, as he puts it, ‘an essence embodied in 
the law or a goal politics sets itself the task of attaining’ [Rancière, Disagreement, p. 33.]. It 
is ‘not given, nor is it claimed’. Equality, by contrast, is ‘practiced’, or what Rancière calls 
‘verified’. [Jacques Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual 
Emancipation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 137, emphasis in original.] 
Equality is, in other words, performed by subaltern groups when they act politically; when, 
that is, they act as if they have the equality they have been denied through the organization of 
the social. In the context under discussion, this suggests that the granting by others of 
‘equality’ or humanity to the displaced, dispossessed and so forth is a ‘police’ response; one 
that, ultimately, sustains that order. On Rancière’s view of equality, see May, Political. 
93 May, Political, p. 49. 
94 Rancière, ‘Politics’, p. 60. 
95 Rancière, ‘Who, p. 303, emphasis added. In Rancière’s idiom these occasions entail 
‘miscounts’, ways of inscribing the ‘uncounted in a space where they are countable as 
uncounted’, Rancière, Disagreement, pp. 38-9. See also Andrew Schaap, ‘Enacting the right 
to have rights: Jacques Rancière’s critique of Hannah Arendt’, European Journal of Political 
Theory, 10:1 (2011), p. 36. 
96 See Rancière, Disagreement. The point about these new subjectivities is that they are not 
policed identities but the mechanism for evading those identities. See Tanke, Rancière, p. 67. 
97 Tanke, Rancière, p. 21. 
98 Humanize, ‘Why we chose’, emphasis added. 
99 The three boys in question, two aged 16 and one aged 19 (Yifrah) were kidnapped from the 
West Bank and murdered, allegedly, by two members of the al-Qassam brigades, the armed 
wing of Hamas. Their murder was one of the triggers for the conflict in the summer of 2014. 
100 This is certainly borne about by a brief examination of the new media. In the US, the New 
York Times, New York Daily News, Washington Post, LA Times, CNN, CBS and Fox News 
all carried stories of their abduction and death, as did the BBC, ITV News, Guardian, The 
Telegraph, and Daily Mail in the UK, as well as, further afield, the Irish Times, Al Jazeera, 
Le Monde, and Le Figaro. Once their names were released by the Israeli state, news reports 
routinely contained biographical information about them (minimally their names and ages), 
as well as their photographs. Some offered more detailed portraits covering their main 
characteristics and hobbies, as well including comments by friends and family 
101 Abusneineh, ‘Reviving’. 
102 Abusneineh in Baddar, ‘More’. 
103 Jenny Edkins, Missing: Persons and Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 2011). Edkins, however, does not connect the person-as-such with the human. 
104 In some cases, the images take the form of ‘martyr’s posters’. Normally, these posters, 
found in the local community and addressed to them, include ‘a photograph of the martyr’, 
 33 
                                                                                                                                                        
some form of text, usually taken from the Koran, various symbols, all enclosed within a 
decorative border. Their purpose is to enable Palestinians to represent themselves ‘as 
courageous heroes rather than victims’. For more on this topic see Mahmoud Abu Hashhash, 
‘On the Visual Representation of Martyrdom in Palestine’, Third Text, 20:3-4 (2006), pp. 
392-93. The stress on resistance was also emphasized by Humanize Palestine in seeking to 
highlight ‘daily acts’ of resistance by Palestinians against their plight in order to problematize 
the construction of their lives as defined exclusively by ‘oppression, massacres and 
occupation’ (Humanize Palestine, ‘Why we chose’). One way it does so is by recording 
whom amongst the dead were involved in conventional resistance, as say fighters in the Al 
Qassam brigades. 
105 All the cited examples are taken from Humanize Palestine, ‘In memory: Attack on Gaza 
July 8-August 26 2014’, available at: {http://humanizepalestine.com/category/gaza-2014} 
accessed 3 February 2016}. It is worth noting that its Facebook page takes a similar format to 
the website, replicating much of the information about the initiative featured there, and 
includes the album ‘The Faces & Stories of Palestine’, while its Twitter account also posts 
images and stories of the deceased. In addition, a booklet commemorating those killed during 
the summer of 2014 is available at: {https://issuu.com/humanizepalestine/docs/hp_booklet}, 
accessed 15 March 2016}.  
106 See Rancière, ‘Politics’, p. 62. 
107 This is not to claim, however, that there is never any value, tactical or pragmatic, either in 
seeking recognition within existing norms or from the powerful. Sometimes these may be the 
only options. My point is simply that actions by subaltern groups in performatively enacting 
their own humanity are more are likely to produce, what Anne Phillips calls, ‘a jolt to the 
system’, able to denaturalize and unsettle existing hierarchies, than when humanity is 
conferred on them by others. See Anne Phillips, The Politics of the Human (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 75. 
108 See also Schaap, ‘Enacting’, p. 36.  
109 Humanize, ‘Why we chose’. 
110 Rancière, Disagreement, p. 27, emphasis added. It is worth noting that Humanize 
Palestine operates in English not Arabic. This might be understood as one of the ways in 
which it internationalizes its struggle. 
111 The phrase ‘Black Lives Matter’ was originally coined by Alicia Garza in the wake of the 
acquittal of George Zimmerman for the killing of seventeen-year-old Trayvon Martin. The 
hashtag was added by her friend Patrisse Cullors, one of the other founders of Black Lives 
Matter with Garza and Opal Tometi. Elizabeth Day, ‘#BlackLivesMatter: the Birth of a New 
Civil Rights Movement’, The Guardian (19 July 2015). 
112 The hashtag #SayHerName was coined by the African American Policy Forum. See their 
document, Say Her Name: Resisting Police Brutality Against Black Women (July 2015). See 
also Treva B. Lindsey, ‘Post-Ferguson: A “Herstorical” Approach to Black Violability’, 
Feminist Studies, 41:1 (2015), pp. 232-39 
113 An image of the list is available at 
{https://twitter.com/SofiaBettiza/status/593344358696558592}, accessed 30 April 2015}. In 
this instance, the politics of naming the dead also extends to how the dead ought to be 
described: as ‘migrants’, ‘refugees’, ‘asylum seekers’ and so forth. 
114 Its website is available at: {https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/namingthedead/the-
dead/?lang=en}, accessed 10 July 2016}.  
115 I am not making an a priori claim here that appropriating the language of the human will 
always and necessarily have such radical or positive effects for the ungrievable. Much 
 34 
                                                                                                                                                        
depends on the determinate circumstances in which such an invocation occurs. There will 
almost certainly be times it fails, where opportunities to resignify the human are curtailed or 
even foreclosed. At such moments, and despite the issues outlined in this paper, others may 
have to challenge specific practices of dehumanization on behalf of those who are unable to 
do so. See Lloyd, ‘(Women’s)’, p. 99. 
